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Abstract 
 The concept of hope has infused human culture for millennia and in modern times challenged 
psychologists’ attempts to define and measure individuals’ level of hope. The beneficial impact of 
increasing hope to improve physical and mental well-being is a tested therapeutic intervention. However, 
little research has explored this matter in a coaching context. As a practicing coach, I regularly encounter 
issues around hope with my clients.  As a consequence an action research project was designed to address 
my own personal development as a coach, but also to explore the challenges in identifying, improving and 
measuring levels hope in clients, using Snyder’s hope theory (1994, 2002) and the hope scale (Lopez, 
Snyder and Pedrotti, 2003). 
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Introduction 
The concept of ‘hope’ has been important in human philosophy since classical times; when 
Pandora released sorrow and disease into the world from her glass jar, only hope remained as a solace for 
mankind (March, 1998). Even the acerbic, satirical seventeenth century poet Alexander Pope thought 
hope is the essential disposition for contentment. As Pope reflects on the human condition in his Essay on 
Man, hope is a recurring theme, because with hope comes happiness. Hope helps man to overcome the 
fears of an unknown future:  “Hope springs eternal in the human breast” (Davis, 1978, p. 244).  
Indeed we find man’s experience of hope in our culture throughout philosophy, religion and 
literature (Aronson, 1999; Magaletta & Oliver, 1999; Pippin, 1999; Miceli & Castelfranchi, 2010). In the 
Christian tradition, hope prevails as ‘an anchor for the soul, firm and secure (Heb.5:19) and as a spiritual 
virtue from Job to John (Job 13:15; 1 John. 3:3.). The French existential philosopher Marcel gives hope a 
dominant role in his account of the human condition (Stratton-Lake, 1999). For Marcel, hope is different 
from optimism that has an implied detached certainty in one’s prospects. Hope on the other hand, is 
always ‘involved and participating in the creative process of being’ (Stratton-Lake, 1999, p. 344).   
In my coaching practice, I frequently work with clients who express a lack of hope, as they face 
adversity or struggle to achieve their goals and I think my practice could improve by helping clients 
enhance their level of hope. However, to achieve such a development, I need a more practical 
understanding of hope than the transcendent notions of Pope. Once I can explicate my meaning of hope, I 
shall also need a means to measure my clients’ perceived changes in hope level.  
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In modern psychology, hope is a concept that has been the focus of considerable research. As a 
leading researcher in the field, Rick Snyder (1994, 2002) refined his theory of hope facing the greatest 
adversity himself, trying to manage debilitating pain, as he was treated for the cancer. Among the 
theoretical models for hope, Snyder’s (1994) construct appeals most, because of the ostensible connection 
with coaching and therapy (Lopez et al. 2004; Kauffman, 2006; Magyar-Moe, 2009; Riskind, 2010).  
According to Snyder (2002), understanding hope theory can make a broad, positive contribution to 
society by reducing frustration and despair. Psychological well being in society is improved if people are 
allowed to pursue goal directed activity and achieve rewards. A considerable body of research suggests 
high-hope individuals are more resilient, experience lower levels of anxiety and depression and 
experience better outcomes in the workplace and at home (Lopez et al. 2004; Snyder & Lopez, 2007). 
They are less like to abandon their goals and more likely to stay the course in pursuing their aims 
(Seligman, 2002). Evidence suggests Snyder’s hope theory is a robust model after many years of research 
and testing (Lopez et al. 2004; Kauffman, 2006; Riskind, 2006). This all implies fostering hope through 
coaching has broad benefits to my clients in themselves and in their relationships. As I shall discuss later, 
the potential wider benefits to social well-being of increasing hope, is consistent with the principles of 
action research (McNiff & Whitehead, 2002).        
My interest in hope theory developed through research into positive psychology because the 
concept resonated in my coaching practice. The majority of my coaching is practiced in the framework of 
the British Broadcasting Corporation’s internal coaching network of which I am a member. The network 
is an award winning coaching resource for senior leaders in the BBC and operates under the aegis of 
Corporation’s training and development department, the BBC Academy. I also have some private clients. 
The participants in this research project came from both areas of my coaching practice. In this study, I am 
working with clients situated in challenging circumstances. One is journalist functioning in a high-
pressure environment, subject to public scrutiny and under considerable financial pressures. The other is 
experiencing the contemporary recession in different ways, as a recent graduate struggling to pursue a 
fulfilling career.  
 
In this paper I report how far I helped enhance hope in two clients, based on the three elements of 
Snyder’s hope theory: goals thinking, pathways and agency (1994). I employed an action research (AR) 
methodology, ideal for this small scale, practice focused, project (McNiff & Whitehead, 2002; 
Denscombe, 2010; Bryman, 2008). The literature on hope determines how appropriate the Snyder Hope 
Model (1994, 2002) is for use in this context. I then describe the action research methodology used and 
finally I review the data collected from cycles of coaching with two clients.  
 
Literature 
In coaching practice literature, I found little evidence of explicit discussion of enhancing hope as a 
specific goal of coaching. However, as Kauffman (2006) points out, Snyder’s hope model (2002) shares 
much with some widely used coaching interventions like brainstorming and the ‘wheel of life’ 
(Whitworth et al. 1998); both useful in developing pathways and agency thinking.  
There is much more evidence of a relationship between hope theory and coaching in the application 
of positive psychology in coaching practice (Kauffman, 2006; Peterson, 2006; Green et al. 2007; Biswas-
Diener, 2010; Kauffman et al, 2010). The common conception of hope discussed here is based on 
Snyder’s hope theory (1994, 2002) which describes hope as a positive motivated state and a cognitive 
process with three distinct, yet related elements (Snyder & Lopez (2007, p. 189):  
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(i)   “goal-directed thinking” - valuable but uncertain goals providing direction and end-point. 
  
(ii)  “pathways thinking” - the “perceived capacity to find routes to desired goals.” 
 
(iii) “agency thinking” - “the requisite motivations to use those routes.”  
 
It might be said that these three components of hope, map to the GROW model, commonly used in 
coaching (Whitmore, 2002): G is “goal-directed thinking”; Options express “pathways” and coaching 
interventions in the Will element of GROW, promote “agency thinking”. I also think there is a clear 
similarity between the GROW model in coaching and the G-POWER model designed as a hope 
enhancing tool for use in a therapeutic environment (Lopez et al. 2004, p. 396).  
G What is the client’s goal? 
P  Which pathways does the client identify to move towards achieving the goal? 
O What obstacles lie in the client’s path? 
W What sources of willpower keep the client energised? 
E  Which pathways does the client elect to follow? 
R Rethink the process to reassess the choices made 
Therefore, I think this cognitive model is the pre-eminent modern conception of hope used in 
therapeutic and coaching relationships, often under the umbrella of positive psychology (Snyder et al., 
2000; Lopez et al., 2004; Kauffman, 2006; Magyar-Moe, 2009; Rand & Cheavens, 2009; Biswas-Diener, 
2010).  
The literature also reveals, I think, that Snyder’s hope theory (1994, 2002) complements a range 
coaching and therapy models and interventions. For example, helping clients build hope is a key aspect of 
Cognitive-Behavioural Therapy (Neenan & Dryden, 2002a, 2002b) and Snyder et al. (2000) show how 
hope theory can be used in this context. In the developing arena of positive psychology, the Snyder and 
Lopez (2007) hope construct is influencing coaching and therapy interventions because, it is claimed, 
higher hope corresponds with greater psychological well-being, including improved relationships and 
improved performance, while inhibiting negative emotions (Kaufmann, 2006; Rand & Cheavens, 2009; 
Kauffman et al. 2010; Riskind, 2010).  Hope is not only a factor in psychological but also physical health, 
even functioning as a painkiller, and an aid to strengthening recovery from illness (Frank & Frank, 1991; 
Miceli & Castelfranchi, 2010). 
Two studies that employed Snyder’s hope theory (2002) in a coaching relationship reported 
successful results with clients. Green et al. (2007) demonstrated enhanced hope levels by coaching clients 
across a twenty–eight week life-coaching programme. They adopted a cognitive-behavioural, solution-
focused coaching approach and measured significant increases in hope levels. In another study designed 
to assess the effectiveness of a programme to foster hope in student athletes, Rolo & Gould (2007) claim 
success in increasing client hope levels and recommend Snyder’s hope measures as a useful coaching 
tools. Although a short-term programme lasting only six weeks, each client received twelve sessions. 
Therefore, I think there is some evidence to suggest Snyder’s hope theory (1994) and coaching are 
complementary. The next challenge then, to justify my use of Snyder’s hope theory (1994, 2002) is to test 
how valid it is as a model and how far is it a distinct psychological concept and thus enable me to 
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attribute success to this intervention. I shall contrast Snyder’s model with criticisms that his conception 
fails to take proper account of emotions in understanding hope. I shall also consider if Snyder’s theory is 
not a distinct model but an aspect of other constructs such as optimism (Aspinwall & Leaf, 2002; Carver 
& Scheier, 2002; Carver et al. 2010).  
Critics of Snyder’s hope theory suggest it fails to incorporate other similar concepts such as self-
efficacy and optimism (Lazarus, 1999, 2000; Peterson, 2000, 2006).  Aspinwall and Leaf (2002), 
challenge this lack of integration and the cognitive focus of Snyder’s (1994, 2002) description of hope, at 
the expense of the affective. One of their main criticisms is the emphasis on personal agency, which they 
say, neglects the social contexts influencing perceptions and events. However, Snyder might argue that 
even in difficult times, the psychological capital in high-hope people makes them more likely to be able to 
discern pathways to achieve their goals (Snyder & Lopez, 2007, p. 429).  Aspinwall and Leaf (2002) also 
challenge Snyder’s model by stressing how a person’s hope level may be influenced by the appraisal of 
others. As I shall discuss later, this was a factor for both of the clients who participated in this research.  
Similarly, Lazarus (1999, 2000) draws an affective description of hope seen as part of a coping 
process, because without hope one would inevitably feel despair. He also challenges the agentic value in 
hope as “erroneous because we can hope even when we are helpless to affect the outcome. Self-efficacy, 
or a sense of competence and control, facilitates hope, and it certainly aids in mobilizing problem-focused 
coping actions, but it is not essential to hope” (Lazarus, 1999, p.674). Fredrickson suggested that if an 
affective value is built into the model, hope can be enhanced just as well by helping clients build positive 
emotions and thus broaden their “thought-action repertoire, suppress negative emotions and increase 
resilience” (2001, p. 224). It is easy to see how a client might experience greater hope in those 
circumstances. Earlier, Averill et al. (1990) devised a description of hope based on different elements. 
People hope when they believe their desired outcome is realistic and that what they hope for is socially 
and morally acceptable.  
As in Snyder’s model, hopeful people take action to achieve their goals. In Brunininks and Malle’s 
(2005) later experimental study, they aimed to distinguish these key concepts. Interestingly the 
participants in their study referred to hope as “keeping a person focused on one’s goals, as keeping a 
person going, or as a way to control negative feelings” (2005, p. 334). Their findings portrayed hope “as 
an emotion that occurs when an individual is focused on an important positive future outcome”, often 
with little control over the outcome (2005, p. 338).  Therefore, this study suggested that hope is 
distinguished from other states and, unlike Snyder’s cognitive model, the participants defined hope in 
emotional terms while they described optimism as a cognitive concept. However, there are some 
similarities with Snyder, including the participants’ recognition of the differences between hope and 
optimism, but other researchers discuss hope, not as a distinct concept, but rather as an aspect of optimism 
or self-efficacy.  
Two leading researchers into optimism, Carver and Scheier (2002) suggest there is a strong 
resemblance between Snyder’s hope theory (1994) and their description of optimism. They also challenge 
the importance of personal agency in Snyder’s model. They suggest that confidence in a positive outcome 
is more important than a sense of agency in the process.  For example, they say that people with religious 
beliefs may abrogate personal control over events in favour of divine intervention. Indeed research by 
Murphy et al. (2000) showed lower hopelessness and better health in people with religious beliefs. 
However, this perspective is rebutted by those who claim there are in fact significant differences between 
optimism and hope, identified particularly in terms of agency - not just the will but the ways (Snyder et al. 
2000; Gallagher & Lopez, 2009; Rand & Cheavens, 2009).   
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Taking forward the importance of agency and comparing the concept of self-efficacy with Snyder’s 
hope theory (2002) there are, I think, certain similarities between the conceptions. Maddux (2009) 
described self-efficacy as the belief one can bring about desired outcomes through one’s own actions. 
This belief that ‘you can do it’ seems to me very close to aspects of Snyder’s hope theory (1994, 2002). 
But I question how much real difference there is between the belief that you can generate pathways and 
agency, from the belief that ‘you can do it’? and calls into question how different hope theory is from 
other models and therefore how useful it can be in coaching practice. 
 Snyder (2002) recognises the similarities between his model and the self-efficacy construct but 
points out the latter is situationally contingent on what one believes one can do in certain circumstances.  
Therefore, according to Snyder (2002), this means self-efficacy differs from hope theory. While goals are 
also emphasised in self-efficacy, their role in hope theory differs because “they may be enduring, cross-
situational, situational goal-directed thoughts, or all three (2002, p. 257). While it might be argued these 
differences are minimal, Snyder (2002) distinguishes hope from self-efficacy claiming high-hope people 
assess their overall capabilities to achieve goals, find pathways and discern alternative pathways in the 
face of adversity across circumstances and over time. 
The measure of hope devised by Lopez et al. (2003), which I employed in this research, is designed 
to measure an individual’s level of pathways and agentic thinking, to give a ‘hope score’. Clearly, it is not 
an infallible measure and is criticised by Tennen et al. (2002) who point out that many components of the 
scale conform to other positive psychological constructs, for example the ‘Ways of Coping Scale’. They 
also suggest that more research is needed to look at how positive illusions may be a negative aspect of an 
apparently high-hope person. However, Snyder et al. (2002) refute these criticisms of false hope claiming 
that “positive illusions provide a sense of agency” (p. 1006). 
Finally, another significant objection to the Snyder model (1994, 2002), which in my view casts 
doubt upon it as a distinct concept, is the notion of altruistic hope. For example, one’s hope that people in 
danger of natural disaster will survive, is a disposition clearly beyond anyone’s goal setting faculties, 
although I suppose one might set a goal to act charitably. It is in the light of these many contradictions 
this research was conducted. 
Methodology 
A characteristic of action research (AR) is its heterogeneity (Reason, 2003). Therefore, defining 
AR is challenging, given the range of descriptions (Greenwood & Levin, 1998; McNiff & Whitehead, 
2002; Bryman, 2007; Densombe, 2010). However, a consistent theme in AR inquiry is that “the 
researcher enters a real-world situation and aims both to improve it and to acquire knowledge” 
(Checkland & Holwell, 1998, p. 1). For this study, I entered a real environment (a coaching relationship), 
in order to acquire knowledge and improve my practice “learning in and through action and reflection”. A 
central aspect of AR is that it is an “enquiry by the self into the self” (McNiff & Whitehead, 2002, p. 15). 
Consistent with AR values, I also aimed to work with my clients in the coaching experience to help 
increase their levels of hope and thus add to their well-being. Therefore, the important elements of good 
practice in action research are the practical engagement of the researcher with a real life problem, in a real 
life setting, to stimulate change through a cyclical feedback loop of planning, action, critical reflection 
and learning (Denscombe, 2010).   
The epistemology of action research is different from other empirical research, particularly in terms 
of validation. Rather than producing evidence that can be generalised or replicated, the aim is to assess 
through critical reflection how authentic experience influences practice and then demonstrate this in the 
research. Action researchers appreciate knowledge as an ever-changing experience of learning and it is 
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vital to acknowledge this epistemological stance for reputable action research; “the only certain object of 
research becomes the change process itself” (Checkland and Holwell, 1998, p. 11).  
Given that improving practice and solving practical problems are central aims in AR, it is not 
surprising to find a strong influence of pragmatist philosophy. Following the ideas of Dewey, Lewin and 
more recently Rorty, AR is shaped by the pragmatist idea that knowledge is created through action in a 
given context (Greenwood & Levin, 1998; Brydon-Miller et al 2003; Reason, 2003). The conception of 
knowledge in AR might be reflected in the pragmatist philosopher William James’s contention that ‘it’s 
true if it works’, so truth is a process that changes according to events (Putnam, 1990). Problems are not 
solved forever but are addressed through action and reflection to improve practice and understanding. 
In the pragmatic tradition, knowledge is judged by utility: the question should always be ‘What use 
is it?’ rather than ‘Is it real?’ (Rorty, 1993). Therefore truth is dispensed with in favour of what Dewey 
(1941) called ‘warranted assertibility and such warrant is always going to be contextual, historical or 
sociological (Talisse, 2012).  In fact, Rorty would go further, taking an extreme relativist review and 
claiming that truth is not a philosophical matter at all; truth is what others will agree to; truth is not a goal 
of inquiry (Reason, 2003; Talisse, 2012). Therefore, by this measure, assuming I can conduct a valid AR 
process, apply appropriate critical reflection and demonstrate practical improvement, the findings of this 
study are valid, at least in terms of AR methodology. If the reader thinks these are weak criteria to 
establish validity (as do I), it must be said that AR is designed to be small scale and specific to the context 
and not to be considered generalisable (Denscombe, 2010).  
Some critics argue that taking a pragmatist stance in research is flawed because accepting ‘what 
works’ as a premise for knowledge does not make clear the researcher’s assumptions (Lincoln, 2010). 
Hammersley (2004) goes further in challenging the philosophical foundations of AR. He claims the 
essential concern of AR involving a feedback between inquiry and practice is contradictory. The question 
for Hammersley (2004) is whether action research is about research or about action. It is less about 
commensurability and more about what he claims is a distinct difference between inquiry and action that 
cannot be overcome.  He does however accept the pragmatist influence in AR that implies that inquiry 
flows from human action. 
Action research is also influenced by the works of Polanyi (McNiff & Whitehead, 2002) which 
emphasise tacit knowledge, accepting personal ways of knowing and disputing the idea that inquiry 
should follow a predictable path (Hammersley, 2006). The claims made in this inquiry accept tacit 
knowledge as a valid form of knowing.  
  The participatory and collaborative values in AR are, in my view, complementary with coaching as 
a discipline. Action research is used commonly in coaching research (Grant, 2009). One might say that 
the cyclical nature of the AR feedback loop is similar to some descriptions of the coaching process, for 
example Grant et al (2010, p. 128) describe coaching as a cyclical process to facilitate clients’ goal 
attainment.  
 (i) identify desired outcomes 
 (ii) establish specific goals  
(iii) enhance motivation by identifying strengths and building self- efficacy 
 (iv) identify resources and formulate specific action plans 
 (v) monitor and evaluate progress towards goals 
 (vi) modify action plans based on feedback.  
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This process is described as a “monitor-evaluate-modification” pattern that I think is reflected in the 
knowledge creating process in AR described below.  
 
Sampling 
I am not a full-time professional coach so I work with few clients at a time. Given the time 
constraints to deliver the project, I approached two new clients and invited them to take part. The two 
participants are from very different backgrounds, age and experience. Adam is in his early twenties, living 
at home again after university and now working in the motor industry. He was unhappy, lacking in 
confidence and wanted to make some decisions about his future. Chris is a journalist who recently moved 
to the West. He is in his late thirties with a young family.  He wanted to build his confidence and establish 
himself in his new job. Both clients agreed to record each session and participated in evaluating each 
session to influence the content and direction of next session.  
Research ethics 
I emailed details of the study including the context and reason for the research and my commitment 
to confidentiality. I sought permission to record the sessions and used Oxford Brookes proprietary 
paperwork to record this process formally. These actions are consistent with the ethical dimensions of AR 
outlined by McNiff and Whitehead (2002) and Denscombe (2010). 
 
Action research process, data collection and analysis 
 Before the coaching programme, I invited the clients to complete the Lopez et al. (2003) hope 
scale (Appendix 1), to establish their level of hope. They completed the survey at the beginning (T1) and 
on completion of the coaching process (T2).  
During each session, I framed the coaching around the three elements of Snyder’s (1994) Hope 
Theory using the G-Power model. I also used a range of tools to enhance my clients’ ability to define 
desired goals, identify pathways and increase their agency. For example, identifying cognitive dissonance 
to overcome blocks (Neenan & Dryden, 2002a, 2002b), recalling past successes and offered techniques to 
be used between sessions as hope reminders such as a daily diary of achievements (Lopez et al. 2004; 
Magyar-Moe, 2009).  
 A consistent model in action research is the cyclical nature of the process.   Following the process 
shown in Figure 1, I planned each stage of the AR intervention before the coaching began, including 
inviting both participants to complete and return the hope scale (Lopez et al. 2003) as the bench-mark 
measure to assess how far coaching had changed their level of hope. I recorded and later transcribed each 
coaching session and analysed the transcriptions against the Hope Scale criteria. I used this data as a 
reflective tool to form new plans with my clients for the following sessions. 
 To aid the essential critical reflection aspect of Action Research (Checkland & Holwell, 1998) I 
kept reflection notes after each session using Oxford Brookes ‘Reflective Space’ proprietary forms. There 
is no space here to go into the heterogeneous definitions and descriptions of the reflective process (Lisle, 
2000; Lynch, 2000; Willig 2001; Finlay, 2005, 2009; Yanow & Tsoukas, 2009). Reflection in action is 
acknowledged as a valid, knowledge building process by one of the most influential writers in the field, 
Donald Schön, who appreciates the merits in “situations of uncertainty and uniqueness” like this (Schön, 
1991, p. 69).  I used Hay (2007) as an exemplar of managing the reflective process which is, I suggest, 
contiguous with the action research model outlined above (Hay, 2007, p. 8). 
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Figure 1:  The Action Research Process - adapted from McNiff and Whitehead (2002, p. 40). 
  
A number of concerns infused my research, not least some doubts about how effectively the Snyder 
Hope Scale results would reflect my coaching rather than the influence of other external events. 
Moreover, given the similarity between hope and other concepts how could I be sure the hope enhancing 
interventions (Lopez et al. 2004; Magyar-Moe, 2009), were delivering recognisable outcomes for my 
clients and me?  
 
Findings and discussion  
Before beginning the cycle of coaching, I examined the hope scale scores of each client. Four 
elements are the pathways sub-scale and four are the agency subscale; the additional four elements are 
distracters. The overall scale ranges from a low score of 8 to a high of 32 (Lopez et al. 2003). Both clients 
scored 26 at T1. This represents a moderately high score, so I would expect each client to be able to 
define, pursue and achieve clear goals. Therefore, I expected my clients would establish their coaching 
goals confidently and brainstorm creatively to devise pathways (Magyar-Moe, 2009). However, I found 
something rather different and working with both clients a common theme emerged - their own perceived 
lack of confidence and low-hope.  
 In cycle one Adam was struggling to make a decision about his future.  He had a number of vague 
ideas, but felt unable to clarify what he wanted and to commit to any possible futures:  
 … because I’m scared, ‘cause I don’t know if it’s the right thing to do.  I’m scared of 
taking that risk because it is a massive gamble. It has to be something I’m comfortable with.  
Chris described his habit of criticising his performance and how his confidence had been knocked a 
number of years ago when a new manager told him “he should move on and find something else to do,” 
which had a profoundly negative legacy. 
  I noticed their lack of confidence manifested in different ways.  In Adam’s case, his lack of 
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confidence seemed to influence his inability to define a desired goal or summon the agency to pursue 
possible pathways. He engaged in playing the ‘yes, but’ game described in Transactional Analysis 
(Stewart & Jones, 1987). With him, there was a clear sense of stasis: “It’s about having the confidence to 
take that jump in the first place, which is what I don’t have. I think that’s my problem.” He was 
profoundly concerned that his career choice received approbation from his family and the wider world. 
This seemed to be inconsistent with the moderately high-hope person recorded in his hope scale result at 
T1, questioning the merit of this single instrument. However, Green et al. (2007) found the hope scale 
both internally and temporally reliable. They also found significant improvement in hope levels in their 
clients. Perhaps the greater number of coaching sessions in their study (ten compared with three) is 
significant.  
On reflection after the first session, I felt that, despite his score, Adam was not demonstrating much 
hope by the Snyder (2002) criteria. Moreover, even after coaching helped him recognise his own 
‘cognitive dissonance’ and his ‘yes, but’ thinking (Neenan & Dryden, 2002b), he was still unwilling to 
commit to a goal or pathways with agency. I have experienced this with clients before: despite their 
awareness of the cognitive dissonance in their beliefs, they still felt the same emotionally. This suggests 
to me that defining hope as a cognitive construct, underplays the feeling of hope as an emotion proposed 
by Aspinwall and Leaf (2002), as discussed above. Therefore, I decided in the next session I would invite 
Adam to explore the emotions around his fears to see if awareness would help develop his agency and 
commitment to goals.  
With Chris, his lack of confidence manifested in a powerful uncertainty that his boss had faith in 
him despite the explicit contradictory support: “yes, Mark did tell me he was delighted to have me here 
and that he knew I was ‘the right man for the job.’” Chris described how he doubted colleagues’ approval 
in his skills and qualities. He said he would always think about what had gone wrong for him during that 
day on his journey home. He felt his previous bad experience with a former boss had really knocked his 
confidence and now he did not know what to do. This seemed again, inconsistent with his hope scale 
score. For Chris to begin to develop pathways and agency, I felt he needed to build some confidence, so I 
decided to work on helping him reframe his former experience and to let go of that grudge (Magyar-
More, 2009). 
My learning from this first cycle with Chris was that there are many emotional aspects to building a 
sense of hope. I decided that enhancing hope was more complicated than helping clients define goals, 
pathways and a sense of agency in a cognitive process and that the deep emotions at play, also needed to 
be explored in order to enhance hope. This would mean exploring and surfacing my clients’ emotional 
barriers. I also asked Chris to complete a diary, in which he would record three achievements each day. I 
hoped this classic positive psychology tool for generating positive emotions would help him reframe his 
negative thinking (Kauffman, 2006). 
 In the next coaching cycle, Chris said the diary exercise was particularly helpful:  
I’ve kept my little book, I’ve been doing that, three things actually and sometimes I look back 
over it [...]. It helps me keep thinking about the good things in the day rather than thinking 
f**k that went wrong today. It’s definitely made me think in a different way. 
Chris also found that reframing his bad experience with a former boss within the context of his whole 
career, was very helpful. He said he was feeling more positive generally. During this session, Chris was 
clearer about his goals and more flexible in pathways thinking. The positive emotions generated by the 
achievements diary appeared to enhance Chris’s hope. He seemed more positive about his sense of 
agency. This might imply that hope that can be developed by building positive emotions (Fredrickson, 
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2001). 
  In Adam’s second cycle, I planned to help him surface where his fears and blocks were coming 
from and which appeared to cause his inability to commit to a goal with a sense of agency. I asked Adam 
what he was really worried about.  
 I think it’s failure; it’s a sense of pride [...], I think it’s all about pride. It’s about appearance 
 having the right appearance with people who think you are successful. ‘It is ridiculous but 
 you don’t want people to think you’re some tramp’ ‘It’s completely irrational.  
Adam felt that if others approved of his choices, they became valid. For me, this resonated with the 
Aspinwall and Leaf (2002) challenge to the Snyder hope theory, that social context and approval of others 
are important influences. I tried a range of interventions with Adam to move away from his ‘yes, but’ 
thinking by recalling previous successes. 
On reflection, this was a more helpful session. I felt that during the first cycle, I had worked within 
my professed cognitive-behavioural, solutions-focused approach and we were stuck. I adopted a different 
approach as Adam explored the emotional impact of his fears and what they meant to him.  
 In session three, Chris expressed and portrayed a distinct improvement in his level of hope. He was 
certainly more positive: “Yeah, I think.... I’m enjoying it a lot more. It was frustrating, but talking things 
through and, you know, dealing with things differently.” In this session, Chris wanted to work on a 
longer-term goal for his future career. He visualised the person he wanted to become:  
 someone who’s more confident and more self assured [...], I have put things away in dark 
 rooms to avoid them, to just carry on and survive them [...], I do feel I have turned a corner 
 actually.  
By cycle three Adam too had found a sense of agency. He said that he felt:  
A lot lighter. When you are in a state of confusion and make progress, you feel happier and 
confident and you can action those things [...]. Three positions I applied for last night, I 
wouldn’t have applied for before [...]. I would spend hours looking aimlessly so now I know 
what kinds of thing I want to do. 
 On reflection after this cycle, I felt that both clients’ hope was enhanced. They seemed more 
confident and they had acted on the pathways they devised. However, referring back to other theoretical 
models, I think both clients were also more optimistic, in that they described the expectation of a good 
outcome, which Carver and Scheier (2002) recognise as different from the agentic process in hope theory. 
Perhaps hope and optimism are too closely related to treat separately. 
  At the end of the coaching programme, Adam and Chris completed the hope scale index again (T2). 
There was barely a difference, with both clients still being moderately high hope individuals. I cannot 
know if this might have changed with continued cycles of coaching. Judging by my clients’ explicit 
improvements in devising pathways and actions, it is reasonable to believe their level of hope would 
increase, but perhaps not reflected in the Hope Scale. Moreover, I cannot know that it is hope 
enhancement and not self-efficacy or optimism and wonder ‘does it really matter?’ 
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Conclusion  
The aim of this research was to improve my coaching practice by developing my ability to foster 
hope in my clients using Snyder’s hope theory (2002).  My assessment of the outcomes is mixed and 
uncertain for a range of reasons. My conclusions, consistent with AR studies, are equally cautious and 
limited.  
This project was successful in terms of learning. I developed more knowledge of positive 
psychology and Snyder’s hope theory (2002) and the hope scale (Lopez et al. 2003). I learned about 
action research and the focused critical reflection throughout the process was helpful. However, in terms 
of the aims for this research, to improve my practice by fostering hope in my clients, I think this study 
was unsuccessful. Looking at the evidence and reflecting on my experience, I think my clients 
experienced improvements in their levels of hope. However, I think Snyder’s theory simply reflects what 
happens in most of my coaching sessions: I work with clients to build valued goals, devise pathways and 
develop agency. I think the Snyder model is broadly similar to conventional coaching models such as 
GROW. Therefore, although I can describe hope in terms of Snyder’s cognitive model, it has not helped 
me develop my practice.  
It seems to me that hope is not a discreet phenomenon defined in such simple terms. My experience 
of the way my clients presented their challenges suggests that effectively I always work with Snyder’s 
hope theory, but simultaneously with optimism, self-efficacy and self-esteem. My experience suggests 
that isolating a cognitive description of hope from the affective world is unhelpful, maybe even wrong.  
As for measuring hope using the hope scale, this proved unhelpful.  Perhaps there are flaws in the 
design and such simple, blunt questions may not reveal an inherent complexity in the meaning of hope. 
Notwithstanding the vast amount of research supporting its validity, I was unable to infer any useful 
understanding of the scale to influence and assess my practice. If assessment tools are used at all, perhaps 
a more helpful way to develop practice is by using range of scales measuring optimism, ways of coping, 
self-efficacy, resilience and hope, under the umbrella of “psychological capital” (Snyder & Lopez, 2007, 
p. 429).  
Of course, many of these outcomes may be connected with flaws in the design of this research. On 
reflection, more coaching sessions might have delivered different results in common with Green et al. 
(2007) for example.  I failed to involve my participants as rigorously as I might in the design of the 
project. While there was collaboration, feedback and dialogue with the participants throughout, there was 
not a partnership of equals in the research. Another difficulty affecting this project was a ‘clash’ between 
action and research. I found it difficult to maintain a happy integration between these two essential 
components, often unsure what was research and what was action - perhaps supporting Hammersley’s 
criticisms of AR (2004), but also likely due to my inexperience as a researcher.  
Finally I am unconvinced I can attribute any benefits for my clients in employing Snyder’s hope 
theory; however my clients reported benefits from the coaching. Such as they were, these benefits may be 
attributed to many factors - the relational nature of coaching and my presence and encouragement in 
developing positive emotions for example (Fredrickson, 2001). Perhaps hope is best assessed through 
clients’ feedback, described in their own vernacular, rather than a scale. This matters to me more, 
regardless of how well my coaching fits with theories or models.   
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Appendix 1 
 
Hope Scale (adapted from Lopez et al., 2003 p. 401). 
 
 Below is a series of questions which are designed to give a sense of people’s beliefs and attitudes 
which will help with goals. Please read the following questions and grade each, 1-4 according to the scale 
below. Please try to answer according to your honest beliefs. When you have completed the questionnaire 
please return by email. Thanks. 
 
1. = Definitely false       2. = Mostly false       3. = Mostly true     4 = Definitely true 
 
1. I can think of many ways to get out of a jam 
2. I energetically pursue my goals 
3. I feel tired most of the time 
4. There are lots of ways around any problem 
5. I am easily put off in an argument 
6. I can think of many ways to get the things in life that are most important to me 
7. I worry about my health 
8. Even when others get discouraged I know I can find a way to solve the problem 
9. My past experiences have prepared me well for my future  
10. I’ve been pretty successful in life  
11. I usually find myself worrying about something  
12. I meet the goals that I set for myself 
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